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Abstract
This paper investigates how institutional investors affect capital structures of Borsa Istanbul (BIST) 
firms. Data is gathered for the period between 2005 and 2013 for 150 firms. Prior years are not taken 
into consideration in order not to distort the data since inflationary accounting practices were applied 
in the market before 2005. Data is obtained from Bloomberg database and Central Registry Agency. 
Sample consists of 150 non-financial firms which have full data set for the research period. Panel data 
analysis is used to analyze 1,350 firm-year observations. Data is investigated for the relation between 
institutional ownership and financial leverage. The model has been designed such that financial 
leverage is dependent variable, and institutional ownership is explanatory variable. Control variables 
such as tangibility, size, tax, profit, liquidity and market value / book value have also been employed 
in the model. The result of the model shows that there is a significantly negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and financial leverage. 
Keywords: Institutional Ownership, Financial Leverage, Emerging Market, Panel Data Analysis
JEL Classification: G30, G32
Özet
Bu çalışma, kurumsal yatırımcıların Borsa Istanbul’da (BIST) yer alan firmaların sermaye yapısını 
nasıl etkilediğini incelemektedir. 2005 ile 2013 yılları arasında 150 firma için data toplanmıştır. 2005 
yılından önce enflasyon muhasebesi uygulaması yapıldığı için veriyi saptırmamak adına daha önceki 
dönem dataları kullanılmamıştır. Veri için Bloomberg ve Merkezi Kayıt Kuruluşu veritabanlarından 
bilgi alınmıştır. Örneklem kümesi finansal alanda olmayan ve tüm datası mevcut 150 firmadan 
* Marmara University, Faculty of Business Administration, Department of Business Administration, 
E-mail: mcinko@marmara.edu.tr
** Master Student, Marmara University, Faculty of Business Administration, Department of Business 
Administration, E-mail: okasaboglu@yahoo.com
Murat ÇİNKO • Oytun Tansel KASABOĞLU
156
oluşmaktadır. Panel veri analizi ile 1,350 şirket-yıl gözlemi analiz edilmiştir. Veri, kurumsal sahiplik 
ile finansal kaldıraç arasındaki ilişki için incelenmiştir. Modelde, finansal kaldıraç bağımlı değişken ve 
kurumsal sahiplik açıklayıcı değişken olarak tasarlanmıştır. Tutulabilirlik, büyüklük, vergi, kar, likidite 
ve piyasa değeri / defter değeri kontrol değişkenleri olarak yer almıştır. Modelin sonucunda kurumsal 
sahiplik ile finansal kaldıraç arasında anlamlı ve negatif bir ilişki görülmüştür. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kurumsal Sahiplik, Finansal Kaldıraç, Gelişmekte olan Piyasalar, Panel Veri Analizi
JEL Sınıflaması: G30, G32
1. Introduction
Illiquidity is one of the most critical situation for a company. It might take the company to 
bankruptcy process.  Capital structure plays important role from this perspective. Therefore, 
capital structure is one of the most important issues of corporate finance. Capital structure deals 
with how a company finance its assets and expenses. These can be financed by short-term, long-
term loans or by equity. These instruments have different properties and conditions. In order to 
find optimal debt-equity mix, different theories and researches have been put forth. 
Modern theories are discussed which are emerged after Modigliani and Miller’s seminal paper 
“The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment.”  Modern theories are 
Trade-off Theory, Agency Cost Theory, Signaling Theory, Pecking Order Theory and Market 
Timing Theory. Furthermore, papers related to determinants of capital structure are discussed. 
In addition to capital structure, ownership types are scrutinized. Institutional investors are 
important players of the capital markets. Their investments are not only in their own countries 
but distributed around the whole world. Therefore, throughout the literature, institutional 
investors are investigated to understand their effects in different contexts. During the literature 
review, most of the researchers search for the performance relations of ownership types. In this 
paper, their relation, if exists, with capital structure is examined. 
2. Literature Review
The analysis of capital structure, which attempts to find optimal mix of debt and equity, has 
been an important area of financial research since capital structure changes firm’s cost of capital, 
affects value of the company, is the source for assets, determines capital and interest payments, 
and finally cash outflow is critical since it may lead to bankruptcy of the firm. Besides, effects of 
different ownership types on the company are also another significant area.
Before Modigliani and Miller, there were other theories which tried to explain optimal debt and 
equity mix. These were called classical theories. Classical theories were focused on the lowest 
cost of capital. When the lowest cost of capital is found, firm value maximized. These theories 
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are Net Income Approach, Net Operating Income Approach and Traditional Approach to Capital 
Structure. 
Modern period starts with Modigliani and Miller’s (MM hereafter) “The Cost of Capital, 
Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment.”  Some of the major modern theories are 
Trade-off Theory, Agency Cost Theory, Signaling Theory, Pecking Order Theory, and Market 
Timing Theory.
Modigliani and Miller Proposition I (1958)
First proposition is irrelevance of the capital structure. Based on this proposition market value of 
a firm is not affected by capital structure of a firm. Excluding tax effects, value of a firm can be 
calculated by dividing net operating income to the rate appropriate to firm’s risk class. Therefore, 
although capital structure decisions are vital for the firms and affect cash flow stream, do not 
change the value but the distribution of the cash flow between lenders and shareholders.  
Modigliani and Miller Proposition II (1988)
Second proposition is about the relation of cost of debt and cost of equity. MM stated that there is 
a positive relation between expected return of the investors and leverage due to the risk increase 
for investors.  
In conclusion, this theoretical approach with very strong assumptions does not reflect the reality. 
However, as Miller stated 
“showing what does not matter can also show, by implication, what does matter” 
these propositions put different perspective, led new theories to emerge and started modern 
period for theories of capital structure.
Trade-off Theory
Trade-off term is used by different researchers for related set of theories. In these theories, main 
idea is to analyze costs and benefits of different capital structure plans. The aim is to find a 
solution which balances marginal cost and marginal benefit. The original version of trade-off 
theory was structured on top of MM irrelevance proposition. After income tax and tax shield 
added to the theory, then optimal capital structure turned out to be 100% debt financing. Also, 
debt financing help reduce the agency cost. To avoid this extreme assumption, a balancing item 
was needed. Cost of financial distress is the disadvantage of the debt. There are direct and indirect 
costs of financial distress. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) discussed Trade-Off Theory which is 
based on costs and benefits of debt. 
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Agency Cost Theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) discussed the theory in their paper about principal and hired 
agencies. There are principals and agencies in the companies. Principals would be shareholders 
or owners and agencies are directors or managers. Principals delegate some of their authorities to 
agents and they expect agents to work for maximization of shareholder’s wealth. Agents may be 
challenged by opportunities and may not work fully for the interest of the company or principals. 
Instead, they may want to maximize their values even it decreases the wealth of the company. 
Signaling Theory
Ross (1977) had different approach to MM’s assumption of perfect markets by adding information 
asymmetry. Ross questioned how the dynamics of the market should be if not everyone has equal 
information. Managers or insiders are assumed to have more information about cash flows and 
profitability of their firm than outsiders. Therefore, the analysis made by the market with the 
available information to outsiders might not be enough to distinguish firms with two different 
prospects. Thus, two firms might be priced equally which is unfair to one with better prospects. 
Pecking Order Theory
Myers and Majluf (1984) discussed the Pecking Order Theory as an alternative explanation for 
how a firm chooses their capital mixtures. There are three possible sources of financing. These 
are internal funds, debt and new equity. According to theory, internal funds should be preferred 
first, debt at the second step and finally new equity. 
Market Timing Theory
Baker and Wurgler (2002) discussed the Market Timing Theory. Although, MM  assumed that 
markets are efficient and competitive, in real world they are not. Market timing theory suggests 
that managers create their capital structure strategy based on responses to market perception of 
firm’s current position. These responses might be in two ways. First one is that misperception 
of the market might cause the mispricing of assets, firm or shares. For instance, when stock 
prices are low, there is a tendency to equity repurchases. Second one is that adverse selection of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) which is based on information asymmetry. Since the insiders know the 
company and company’s prospect better and before than outsiders, they might act before the 
market to benefit from expectations or excess information. For example, when they think that 
stocks are overvalued, they issue additional equity.
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Ownership Types and Institutional Ownership
Throughout the literature ownership types and their effects on different performance metrics 
of companies were analyzed. Behaviors of individuals, foreign investors, institutional investors, 
hedge funds, and corporates are some of the ownership types that were researched for. 
Role of the institutional ownership grows significantly in capital markets. Aguilar (2013) gave the 
statistics from U.S. show that equities managed by institutional investors have risen from 7-8% 
in 1950 to 67% in 2010. The reason of the increase is that people want to invest in markets with 
pooled-investment vehicles.  
In order to understand effects of institutional ownership, first of all it needs to be defined. Celik 
and Isaaksson (2013) mentioned that there is no clear definition for it. They continued that 
institutional investors are not physical people but they are organized as legal entities. However, 
their legal form varies widely such as joint stock companies, limited liability partnership, and 
incorporation by special statute. Davis and Steil (2004) defined as 
“specialized financial institutions that manage savings collectively on behalf of small 
investors towards a specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return maximization, 
and maturity of claims.”
Gregoriou (2012) compared to individual investors and banks, institutional investors have 
different advantages. First of all, diversification can be made easily due to high trading volume. 
It is a risk-reduction strategy to enhance the portfolio with different kind of inputs. Portfolio 
should be diversified with assets with different movement tendencies. Second, banks try to match 
maturities of their assets and liabilities. Therefore, their investment capacity is limited. On the 
other hand, institutional investors may invest long-term liabilities as long as they are in line 
with their investment scheme. Third, compared to individuals, economies of scale lower costs 
of transactions for institutional owners from different aspects. Cost of experts is divided among 
investors. Thanks to higher volume there are lower commission rates applied. Finally, there is 
information asymmetry and institutions can have better access to knowledge.
3. Methodology
Panel data analysis is used to investigate the relations within data. Longitudinal data or cross 
sectional time series data are different names of panel data. A panel data contains set of data for 
each individual for different time periods. The importance of the panel data analysis is that it 
combines several years of data for cross-sectional observations. 
Regression of panel data is different than both time series and cross-section regression. In the 
equation, there are two subscripts. 
                     i = 1,…,I     t = 1,…,T      (1)
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where  is the dependent variable observed for individual i at time t,  is the independent 
variable,  is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect, and  is the error term. 
                                                                       (2)
where denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and  denotes the disturbance. 
(Baltagi, 2005, pp. 25)
There are two models in panel data analysis to solve unit effects. These are fixed effects model 
and random effects model. Fundamental difference of these two is originated from the role of 
the parameter estimate of a dummy variable. In a fixed effects model it becomes the part of 
the intercept and in a random effects model it becomes an error component. In both fixed and 
random effects model, slopes remain the same across group or time period.  
In order to understand which technique to deploy, group effect, time effect and the combination 
of these two should be analyzed. If group and time effect has different intercepts in the equation 
then fixed effects model can be applied, if group and time effect have different disturbances then 
random effects model can be applied. 
Fixed Effects Model:                                        i = 1,…,I   t = 1,…,T ( 3)
Fixed effects model assumes the same slopes and constant variance across individual and 
examines individual differences in intercepts.  is allowed to be correlated with other regressors, 
since an individual specific effect is time invariant and accepted a part of the intercept. The fixed 
effect model is estimated by least squares dummy variable regression and within effect estimation 
methods.    
F test or Wald Test can be done to test fixed effects model. Null hypothesis of the Wald Test is 
that all dummy parameters except for one for the dropped are all zero. If null hypothesis is not 
rejected for the test, Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is used. Otherwise, fixed effects 
model is used. 
 = … =    = 0
                                    (4)
Random Effects Model:                   i = 1,…,I  t = 1,…,T                 (5)
where  is a fixed or random effect specific to individual or time period.
Random effects model assumes that individual effect is not correlated with any regressor and 
random effects model estimates error variance specific to groups. Thus,  is an individual 
specific random heterogeneity or a part of the composite error term. Therefore, this model can 
also be called an error component model. Slopes of regressors and intercept are the same across 
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individual. Difference is stemmed from individual specific errors, not from their intercepts. 
Random effects model is estimated by generalized least squares if a covariance structure of an 
individual i, ∑, is known. Otherwise, feasible generalized least squares or estimated generalized 
least squares methods are used. 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test can be done to test random effects model. The null hypothesis for 
Breusch-Pagan LM test is that individual-specific or time-specific error variance components are 
zero. If null hypothesis is not rejected for the test, Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is 
used. Otherwise, random effects model is used (Breusch and Pagan, 1980).
                                          (6)
Depending on the results of the Wald test and Breusch-Pagan LM test, following procedures are 
applied. If null hypothesis is not rejected for both tests, Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model is used. If null hypothesis is not rejected for Breusch-Pagan LM test and rejected for F 
test, Fixed Effects model is used. If null hypothesis is not rejected for F test and rejected for 
Breusch-Pagan LM test, Random Effects model is used. If null hypothesis is rejected for both 
tests, Hausman Test is run (Park, 2011).
Table 1: Methodology to Select the Model
Breusch-Pagan LM Test ( )
Null Hypothesis Not Rejected Rejected
F 
Te
st
(W
ald
 Te
st)
Not Rejected Pooled OLS Model Random Effects Model
Rejected Fixed Effects Model Fixed and Random or select based 
on Hausman Test
Hausman test is run to select between fixed or random effects. The null hypothesis is that random 
effects should be used and the alternative is fixed effects. It tests whether the unique errors are 
related with regressors (Green, 2008). 
                       ( 7 )
The non-existence of multicollinearity is one of the assumptions of least squares method 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  Multicollinearity issue has to be tested for the model. If absolute 
value of pairwise correlation coefficient is higher than 0.8 and significant, there is an issue of 
multicollinearity. In the appendix table 5, Pearson Correlation Matrix is given for the model’s 
explanatory and control variables excluding outliers detected. No multicollinearity issue has been 
detected. 
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When two or more error terms are correlated between different error terms are not all equal 
to zero, then error term is subject to serial correlation. The model is tested for autocorrelation. 
Wooldridge test is done for autocorrelation. First, pooled OLS is regressed in first difference 
and residuals are predicted. Then, the residuals are regressed on its first lag and coefficients on 
those lagged residuals are tested. (Wooldridge, 2010). Null hypothesis for Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation is “no first-order autocorrelation”. Since the p-value is lower than 1%, the data has 
autocorrelation issue (F = 77.87 p  =  .000)
Heteroscedasticity occurs when variance of error terms may vary over observations. In order to 
test heteroscedasticity, first the model is run. Then, Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier for 
random effects is tested. Since the chi-square value is 1170.46 and p values than 1 %, the data is 
heteroscedastic. 
The variables that are going to be used in the study are Leverage as a dependent variable, 
Institutional ownership as an independent and Size, Tangibility, Firm Size, Tax Rate, Profitability, 
Liquidity and Market value over Book Value as controlled variable. 
4. Empirical Findings
Data is gathered for the period between 2005 and 2013 for 150 firms. Prior years are not taken 
into consideration in order not to distort the data since inflationary accounting practices were 
applied in the market before 2005. 
Data is measured yearly and it is a short panel which means number of firms are higher than 
number of years. The data is balanced which means all firms have data for all years. Same firms 
exist for each period thus the data is fixed panel not rotating. The data is arranged in the long 
form which means that first firm has data set for all years as different lines of data then second 
firm comes with all the data lines.
Data is obtained from Bloomberg database and Central Registry Agency (CRA). From Bloomberg 
database, total assets, total equity, fixed assets, operating income, total current assets, total current 
liabilities, market-to-book values, pretax income, and net income values are gathered for each 
year for each company.  From CRA database, institutional investors’ ratio is calculated among 
the whole investors. Sample consists of 150 non-financial firms which have full data set for the 
research period. Consecutive data is critical to create balanced panel data. Panel data analysis is 
used to analyze 1,350 firm-year observations. Stata 11 is used as a software package. 
Outlier is a data point that is located far away from sample data. Data has to be clear off outliers. 
To define outliers, 1.5 Interquartile Ranges (IQRs) rule used which is any data point below the 
first quartile minus 1.5 IQR or above the third quartile plus 1.5 IQRs. Outliers have been omitted 
when running the model. Descriptive statistics for the data that do not have outlier is given in 
the Table 2. 
A Study of the Relationship Between Institutional Ownership and Capital Structure: Evidence From Turkey
163
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable
LVRG 973 0.47 0.20 0.05 0.98
Explanatory Variable
INST 973 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.97
Control Variables
TANG 973 0.36 0.19 0.00 0.91
SIZE 973 5.81 1.34 2.63 9.07
TAX 973 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.53
PROF 973 0.05 0.07 -0.14 0.25
LQDTY 973 1.74 0.91 0.10 4.78
MVBV 973 1.44 0.83 0.15 4.16
The model to test the hypothesis “There is a significantly negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and financial leverage” is shown below.
where; 
calculated as total liabilities over book value of total assets at year t for firm i
calculated as the number of shares held by institutional investors as a share of  total free 
float at year t for firm i
measured by the ratio of tangible assets to total assets at year t for firm i
measured by natural logarithm of total assets at year t for firm i
calculated as the ratio of charged taxes to earnings before taxes at year t for firm i
calculated as operating income over total assets at year t for firm i
measured as total current assets over total current liabilities at year t for firm i
calculated as market value of firm’s equity over book value of firms’ equity at year t firm i
error term in year t for firm i
   I firm index
   t year index
After outliers are cleared from the data set multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
is checked. According to the correlation values among the independents there is no multicollinearity 
in the data set. However, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests showed that there exists 
problem in the data set.  Fixed or Random effect model is decided by the procedure of the Table 
1. First of all F test is done and null hypothesis is rejected (F = 17.34 p value .000). Then Breusch-
Pagan LM test is applied and null hypothesis is also rejected (chi-square = 1170.46 and p-value 
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.000). Since both of the tests reject the null hypothesis Hausman test is applied to decide the Fixed 
or Random effect model. The result of the Hausman test given in table 3 showed that Fixed effect 
model should be applied. Since the data have autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity issue “cluster 
(cross section identifier)” code inserted to Stata code to get robust estimate of the model. 
Table 3: Hausman Test
Coefficients
Fixed Random Difference
INST -0.0543 -0.0747 0.0204
TANG -0.2008 -0.2486 0.0478
SIZE 0.0859 0.0562 0.0297
TAX -0.1533 -0.2767 0.1234
PROF -0.0891 -0.0732 -0.0159
LQDTY 0.0262 0.0054 0.0208
248.76
Significance 0.0000
Because of the insignificance of the tax variable which is excluded from the model and model is 
deployed again and results are given in Table 4. 
Table 4: The Results of Panel Data Analysis
  Name of The Variables Coef. t
Dependent 
Variable: LVRG Leverage
Explanatory 
Variable: INST
Institutional 
Investor -0.0570 -2.37**
Control Variables: TANG Tangibility -0.2140 -5.68***
  SIZE Size 0.0785 6.07***
  PROF Profitability -0.1816 -3.19***
  LQDTY Liquidity -0.0897 -12.46***
  MVBV
Market-to-Book 
Value 0.0263 5.34***
Constant cons Constant  0.2447 2.91***
Number of obs (*) 1005 F 66.09
Number of groups 142 Prob > F 0.0000
Goodness of Fit 0.5026  
**, *** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(*) Number decreased due to observations which were excluded  previously  since they were outliers of 
tax variable.
Null hypothesis of the F-test is that all coefficients in the model are zero. F-test shows that null 
hypothesis is rejected with significance less than 1%. Thus, results can be interpreted. 
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The explanatory variable in the model is INST which is denoted for institutional ownership ratio. 
There is a significantly negative relation (t-value = -2.37, p < 0.05). In other words, as institutional 
ownership ratio increases, financial leverage decreases. Michaely and Vincent (2012) show similar 
results and they investigate from both directions. They conclude that “firms in which institutions 
have a strong presence tend toward low leverage, and firms in which institutions strengthen their 
presence are associated with lower leverage”. Tong and Ning (2004) use institutional investors as 
dependent variable with four different proxies. The proxy most relevant to our research is the 
percentage of institutional ownership of a firm which is proved to be insignificant. Based on the 
other proxies they conclude that firms with a low debt ratio tend to attract more institutional 
investors. Crutchley et al. (1999) conduct their analysis only for two years. In 1987, they find 
significantly positive relation between debt as a dependent variable and institutional ownership 
as an independent variable. In contrary, in 1993 they find significantly negative relationship. 
Hasan and Butt (2009) find that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and capital structure but it is statistically insignificant. To analyze the results with theories and 
literature, first increase in the ratio of institutional investors help increase in monitoring like 
creditors. Second, institutional investors do not want to invest in firms with very high level 
of leverage since it increases the bankruptcy risk and cost. If there is an increase in leverage 
ratios significantly, they might sell and exit. Third, attracting more institutional investors to the 
company could be an important sign of trust for the managers of the company. Thus, they can 
keep the leverage at low levels.  These approaches are in line with the above negative relation 
between leverage and institutional ownership ratio. 
The first control variable is TANG which refers to tangibility. There is a significantly negative 
relation (t-value = -5.68, p < 0.01). Pöyry and Maury (2010) test tangibility using book value 
leverages and market value leverages. For both tests, they find significantly negative relations. 
Li, Yue, and Zhao (2009) find significantly negative relation. Sayılgan, Karabacak and 
Küçükkocaoğlu (2006) had expected positive relation for Turkish companies but their study 
resulted in a significantly negative relation. Xuan-Quang and Zhong-Xin (2013) state negative 
relation for tangibility but it is insignificant. De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) find that there is 
a positive relation at 10% significance level for Turkish companies. Michaely and Vincent (2012) 
also show positive relationship. Gurunlu and Gursoy (2010) also look for both book and market 
value leverages. They find correlations for both of them significantly positive. From theoretical 
perspective, it is expected to have positive relationship between leverage and tangibility since 
tangible assets can be used as a collateral which is important for creditors. Also, firms with high 
tangible assets ratio are less prone to bankruptcy risk. However, the result of the sample is not in 
line with theories.   
SIZE is the second control variable which is the indicator of total asset size. There is a significantly 
positive relation (t-value = 6.07, p < 0.01). Michaely and Vincent (2012), Xuan-Quang and 
Zhong-Xin (2013), Gurunlu and Gursoy (2010), Sayılgan, Karabacak and Küçükkocaoğlu 
(2006), Li, Yue, and Zhao (2009) and Céspedes, González, and Molina (2010) all find the relation 
significantly positive parallel to sample’s result. Pöyry and Maury (2010) find negative relation 
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but results are insignificant. De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008) stated significantly negative 
relation. There are two theoretical approaches related to size. First, as size of the firm increases, 
information asymmetry increases. Therefore, managers want to use internal funds first, then 
external funds. Thus, leverage levels are expected to be low for large sized companies. On the 
other hand, bankruptcy risk is important component of trade-off theory. As size increases, the 
firm is less prone to bankruptcy risk. Therefore, it is expected to have high levels of leverage ratios 
for large sized companies. The result, found for the sample is in line with the second approach as 
size increases, leverage also increases.
The only control variable with insignificant relation is that TAX which is denoted for effective tax 
rate. (t-value = -0.57, p>0.05). Although tax shield of interest paid is a very important factor, our 
sample has very different tax rates. The reason is that statutory tax amount is affected by previous 
years’ losses carried and tax incentives benefitted. Arslan and Karan (2006) and De Jong, Kabir, 
and Nguyen (2008) find no significant relation. Céspedes, González, and Molina (2010) find 
negative relation but not all of their findings are significant. Tax shield is important aspect of 
leverage and trade-off theory. Interest payments are tax deductible and it decreases cost of debt. 
As effective tax rate increases, tax shield amount increases therefore cost of debt decreases. Thus, 
it is expected to have high levels of leverage as effective tax rate increases. In the tested sample, 
tax is found insignificant. 
The other control variable is PROF which refers to profitability. There is a significantly negative 
relation (t-value = -3.19, p<0.01). Li, Yue, and Zhao (2009), Céspedes, González, and Molina 
(2010), Sayılgan, Karabacak and Küçükkocaoğlu (2006), and Pöyry and Maury (2010) stated 
significantly negative relation parallel to sample’s result. De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008) 
find negative relation but the result is not significant. There are two theoretical approaches 
for profitability of a firm. First, profitable firms are less prone to bankruptcy risk. Thus, they 
can obtain more leverage from creditors according to trade-off theory. Second, according to 
pecking order theory, firms should use internal funds first because of informational asymmetry. 
Profitability is the major source of internal funding. Therefore, it is expected to have low levels of 
leverage for profitable firms. The result, found for the sample is in line with the second approach, 
as profitability increases, leverage decreases.   
LQDTY is another control variable. It is used to reflect the liquidity ratio. There is a significantly 
negative relation (t-value = -12.46, p<0.01). Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find the relation 
negative. De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008) also find negative relation but the result is not 
significant. Liquidity is a sign of accumulated cash and liquid assets. Therefore, it can be used as 
a first source of internal funding according to pecking order theory. Thus, as liquidity increases, 
leverage level should decrease. In the tested sample, liquidity is found negatively related to 
leverage which is in line with theories.    
The last control variable is MVBV which refers to market value over book value. There is a 
significantly positive relation (t-value = 5.34, p<0.01). Pöyry and Maury (2010) and Gonenc 
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(2003) find significantly positive relation of MVBV for book value leverage. De Jong, Kabir, and 
Nguyen (2008) and Tong and Ning (2004) find negative relation but it is insignificant. Dahlquist 
and Robertsson (2001) stated negative relation. According to signaling theory, firms want to issue 
equity instead of debt when market value is greater than book value in order to benefit from 
additional value. Therefore, there should be negative relation. On the other hand, market-to-
book value can be used as a proxy for growth. If market-to-book value is greater than one, then it 
is a growth firm. Agency problems occur for growth firms. Increase in leverage help increase in 
monitoring facility of creditors. Thus, there should be positive relationship between growth and 
leverage. The result, found for the sample is in line with the second approach, as market-to-book 
value increases, leverage increases.      
5. Conclusion
In this study, the relation of institutional ownership with capital structure is analyzed. Capital 
structure, itself, is one of the most important issues of corporate finance. Theories to identify 
optimal debt-equity mix have been developed throughout the literature. Modigliani and Miller’s 
seminal paper started modern period for capital structure theories. Research and practices are 
continued in this area. Furthermore, ownership types and their performances are also deeply 
investigated area. In this study, rarely studied combination of these two aspects is combined and 
scrutinized. 
To sum up, institutional ownership ratio has a significantly negative relation with leverage which 
is in line with studies of Michaely and Vincent (2012), Tong and Ning (2004) and partial data 
of Crutchley et al. (1999).  Tangibility has a significantly negative relation in the sample which 
is not in line with trade-off theory since increase in tangibility is expected to ease increase in 
level of debt. Size and leverage relation is significantly positive. It is in line with trade-off theory 
which suggests that as size increases, the firm is less prone to bankruptcy risk. Tax has found 
insignificant in contrast to trade-off theory. Profitability has significantly negative relation with 
leverage. It is in line with pecking order theory. Liquidity has significantly negative relation 
with leverage which is in line with pecking order theory. Market-to-book value has significantly 
positive relation with leverage which is in line with the second theoretical approach of agency 
cost and monitoring. To conclude, throughout the literature, the same independent variables 
could lead to different results as a consequence of the selected years, countries and firms. For 
the period and for the selected companies, tested model produces significant results for all of the 
variables excluding tax.  The hypothesis, significantly negative relation between financial leverage 
and institutional ownership is found after analysis. In other words, as institutional ownership 
ratio increases, financial leverage decreases.
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Appendix
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for Explanatory and Control Variables
  INST TANG SIZE TAX PROF LQDTY
TANG .02        
SIZE .56*** .03      
TAX .11*** -.07** .17***    
PROF .19*** -.14*** .20*** .45***  
LQDTY -.02 -.06** -.12*** .23*** .23***
MVBV .21*** -.08** .03 .003 .15*** -.11***
**, *** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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